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ORIGINALISM ALL THE WAY DOWN? 
ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION. 
By John O. McGinnis1 & Michael B. Rappaport.2 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2013. Pp. 298, 
$39.95 (cloth). 
Kurt T. Lash3 
Originalism is a reformist movement in contemporary 
American constitutional law. Its practitioners reject modern 
interpretive theories such as “living constitutionalism” and call for 
the restoration of the foundational understanding of the text. 
Despite vigorous efforts to discredit the movement,4 originalism 
in the twenty-first century enjoys an increasing number of 
scholarly advocates5 and it occupies an essential place in the tool-
box of advocates before American courts.6 But success has its 
costs. As the number of self-identified originalists increase, so do 
disputes regarding the proper normative basis for originalism and 
the degree to which original understanding ought to control the 
resolution of contemporary legal disputes. 
In their book, Originalism and the Good Constitution, John 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport offer both a new justification 
for originalism and what they believe is a purer form of the theory, 
“original methods originalism.” Advocating a “pragmatic” 
 1. George C. Dix Professor of Constitutional Law, Northwestern University. 
 2. Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Professor of Law and Director of the 
Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism, University of San Diego. 
 3. Guy Raymond Jones Chair in Law and Director, Program in Constitutional 
Theory, History, and Law, University of Illinois College of Law. 
 4. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 
B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). 
 5. For contemporary works that rely in whole or in part on originalist theory, see 
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998); 
JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (updated ed., 2014); KURT T. LASH, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN 
CITIZENSHIP (2014). 
 6. For recent examples of judicial application of originalist theory, see both the 
majority and dissenting opinions in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 3020 (2010). 
149 
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justification for originalism based on the benefits of 
supermajoritarian decision-making, McGinnis and Rappaport 
insist that judges must apply the text exclusively through the use 
of interpretive methods in play at the time of the Founding. When 
judges depart from these “original methods,” they (and we) lose 
the benefits of supermajoritarian decision-making. This is a 
creative and provocative approach to originalism that deserves 
serious attention by anyone interested in the expanding corpus of 
originalist theory. Even if not successful in their effort to displace 
what they call “constructionist originalism” (p. 8), McGinnis and 
Rappaport have established methodist originalism7 as an 
important denomination in the originalist Reformation. 
SUPERMAJORITARIANISM AND THE “GOOD 
CONSTITUTION” 
Critics of originalism commonly maintain that a robust 
application of the theory would leave us with a government 
simultaneously underpowered and over-tyrannical. Originalist 
courts would invalidate the post-New Deal administrative state, 
overrule the equality jurisprudence initiated by Brown v. Board 
of Education, and abandon much, if not most, of the individual 
rights protections of the Warren Court. Pollution would go 
unregulated, the poor unprotected, and the will of the people 
here-and-now ignored in favor of the preferences of eighteenth 
century slaveholding white males. In short, the consequences of 
undiluted originalism would be bad. 
McGinnis and Rappaport argue that such criticism is not only 
wrong, it is theoretically obtuse. Good faith judicial enforcement 
of the original meaning of the Constitution would result in good 
consequences, at least most of the time. Had courts consistently 
applied an originalist methodology from the country’s beginning, 
McGinnis and Rappaport argue, we would have avoided Jim 
Crow, Congress would have been granted enumerated power to 
regulate the national economy, and individuals would have an 
enumerated right to sexual equality (p. 90). 
Lest the reader be misled, however, McGinnis and 
Rappaport do not believe that it is the substance of law that makes 
it “good.” Instead, it is the consequentialist values of stability and 
legal predictability that flow from a supermajoritarian 
 7. “Methodist” originalism is my term, but it is both less awkward than “original 
methods originalism” and more appropriate in light of the label imposed by the authors 
on “constructionist” originalism.  
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decisionmaking that makes law “good.”8 Supermajoritarian 
voting procedures ensure broad public acceptance of norms 
intended to remain in place for generations. Participants in such a 
process will likely take the long view and entrench basic 
protections for all citizens (including their descendants) and not 
just those who happen to be in power.9 The likely result is a stable 
body of law that maximizes preference satisfaction among the 
voting citizenry. These “good” benefits will be enjoyed only if 
judges enforce the original textual meaning that triggered 
supermajoritarian support in the first place. Judges who apply 
non-originalist meanings and methods inevitably introduce 
instability and disagreement and, ultimately, place society in a 
worse position than would have been the case had relevant 
decision-makers followed and enforced the Constitution’s 
original meaning. 
Although McGinnis and Rappaport argue that the original 
Constitution emerged from what was primarily a 
supermajoritarian process (p. 62),10 they also acknowledge 
supermajoritarian “failures” such as the original exclusion of 
blacks and women from the voting public (p. 100). These original 
deficiencies, however, were largely remedied through the 
adoption of subsequent amendments, such as the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.11 It was the federal 
government’s failure to properly enforce these amendments that 
blocked the immediate good results that would have otherwise 
 8. See p. 3 (“[S]tringent supermajority rules are likely (and more likely than other 
methods, such as judicial fabrications) to generate good constitutional provisions.”). 
 9. See p. 12 (“Wide support for a constitution helps to create the legitimacy and 
allegiance for the nation’s fundamental law that is especially important in a pluralist 
country like the United States.”). 
 10. See also p. 64 (“We see the greatness of the Constitution as largely the result of 
the supermajoritarian process that enacted it.”). 
 11. The authors only briefly address the question of whether the ratification of the 
Reconstruction Amendments satisfied the authors’ requirement of supermajoritarian 
decision-making. See pp. 69–70 (“While we cannot fully address this issue, we can suggest 
how these amendments are best understood to conform to the supermajoritarian 
approach.”). The authors defer to the work of Akhil Amar who argues that the southern 
states were properly excluded from the amendment process, which, if correct, resulted in 
a supermajoritarian ratification by the remaining states (p. 70). Amar’s analysis and 
conclusion have been strongly challenged by his Yale Law School colleague, Bruce 
Ackerman. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 
1747 n.25 (2007) (responding to Amar’s formalist defense of the adoption of the 
Reconstruction Amendments). Given the major role these amendments play in modern 
constitutional law, determining whether they were adopted by way of a supermajoritarian 
process seems absolutely critical to the authors’ argument. If they were not, then it is hard 
to see how the authors can maintain that we currently have a “Good Constitution” 
according to their own normative methods. It is somewhat disappointing that the authors 
leave the issue unresolved by citing only one side of a vigorous and on-going debate.  
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flowed from the adoption of the remedial Reconstruction 
Amendments (p. 110). 
In support of this claim, the authors rely on a number of 
disputed assertions about the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. For example, McGinnis and Rappaport fault the 
Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson for failing to recognize that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected the equal, if 
unenumerated, rights of contract (p. 110). The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Plessy to uphold racial segregation, of course, is not 
generally criticized because it failed to enforce fundamental 
economic rights. Nor is there anything approaching a scholarly 
consensus about the original meaning of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 On the other 
hand, the authors’ central point is that scholars have been too 
quick to assume that originalist interpretations necessarily lead to 
morally unacceptable decisions like Plessy. This seems entirely 
correct.13 
In fact, McGinnis and Rappaport do a great job explaining 
the pragmatic benefits of a supermajoritarian constitutional 
process. Originalists of all stripes would do well studying the 
opening chapters of The Good Constitution if only to better 
appreciate how the actual mechanics of American 
constitutionalism generate important contemporary societal 
benefits. True, as the authors concede, welfare consequentialism 
is a controversial normative theory. Nevertheless, they make a 
persuasive case regarding the rule of law benefits that attend 
supermajoritarian decision-making, regardless of one’s ultimate 
normative justification for following the original meaning of 
constitutional text. 
COUNTERING THE CONSTRUCTIONISTS 
Given the ever-growing variety of scholars embracing the 
general theory of originalism, it was inevitable that schools of 
originalism would emerge with criticisms of fellow travelers who 
are perceived as straying from the true path. In the case of The 
Good Constitution, the authors spend a significant portion of the 
book contrasting their particular brand of originalism from what 
 12. Compare BARNETT, supra note 5, with LASH, supra note 5. 
 13. See for example, the growing consensus that the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights. See AMAR, supra note 5; 
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1987). See also LASH, supra note 5.  
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they label “constructionist originalism” (p. 139). Exemplified by 
the work of scholars like Randy Barnett and Jack Balkin (p. 
151),14 constructionist originalism distinguishes the discovery of 
constitutional meaning from the act of judicial application.15 
According to constructionists, since judges are not always able to 
fully determine the original meaning of a text or discern exactly 
how it ought to be applied to a particular legal dispute, they must 
often fill the gap between original meaning and current 
application by using a judicially constructed rule of interpretation. 
According to this approach, the less we know about original 
meaning, the more room exists for judges to fill the space with 
non-originalist judicial doctrine.16 
To McGinnis and Rappaport, methods of interpretation 
derived by anything less that supermajoritarian decisionmaking 
threaten to undermine the good consequences otherwise 
generated by originalist methodology (p. 153). Not only is the 
approach problematic, to McGinnis and Rappaport it is wholly 
unnecessary: the same supermajoritarian process that produced 
constitutional text also produced a set of original methods for 
interpreting the text. As the authors put it: 
The constitutional enactors voted to ratify the document based 
on their understanding of the text and how they believed it 
would be interpreted by subsequent generations. Thus, modern 
courts should interpret the Constitution using the same 
interpretive methods that the enactors would have used—a 
process we call original methods originalism (p. 153). 
To McGinnis and Rappaport, meaning and interpretive 
method are so closely entwined that you cannot discern the one 
without the other. “To embrace originalism without embracing 
the enactors’ interpretive rules,” they claim, “is like trying to 
decode a message using a different code than the authors of the 
message employed” (p. 14). This approach collapses the 
distinction between original textual meaning and judicial 
application, since the proper methods of interpretation and 
application are treated as part of the original “grammar” of the 
text. Methodism vanquishes constructionism by completely 
erasing the “construction zone” where non-originalist 
 14. See also BALKIN, supra note 5; BARNETT, supra note 5. 
 15. For a discussion of originalist theory and the distinction between interpretation 
and construction, see Lawrence Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 
FORD. L. REV. 453 (2013). 
 16. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 5, at 16–19 (discussing and rejecting “original 
expectations originalism”).  
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methodology might otherwise apply. This is originalism all the 
way down. 
If all McGinnis and Rappaport were trying to do is suggest 
that the framers expected courts would apply some method of 
interpretation, this would seem obviously true. The historical 
record at the time of the Founding is full of references to various 
theories of textual and constitutional interpretation. The problem 
is, for McGinnis and Rappaport to succeed, they must prove the 
existence of supermajoritarian agreement on the interpretive 
method to be applied to each text of the Constitution. Anything 
less either fails the supermajoritarian requirement or leaves room 
for non-originalist construction. This is an enormous empirical 
burden and one that proves too great for McGinnis and 
Rappaport to carry.17 
CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS AT THE 
TIME OF THE FOUNDING 
As historians of the period know, there were multitudinous 
and often contradictory methods of interpretation in play at the 
time of the Founding.18 This was particularly true when it came to 
interpreting the new federal Constitution. The ratification 
debates pitted one set of interpretive methods against another as 
anti-federalists raised alarms and federalists attempted to put out 
political fires.19 These debates continued after ratification, with 
one side pulling for a broad interpretation of national power, and 
the other calling for what became known as “strict construction” 
in order to maintain the remnant sovereign autonomy of the 
states. 
Here is just one historical example. The text of Article III 
declares that “the judicial power shall extend . . . to 
 17. Arguably, McGinnis and Rappaport concede this burden. At one point, they 
state that “determining the meaning of language requires reference to the interpretive 
rules and methods that were deemed applicable to the Constitution at the time it was 
enacted” (p. 118). Also, “[i]t is our position that originalism requires modern interpreters 
to follow the original interpretive rules used by the enactors of the Constitution” (p. 119). 
And again, “[o]riginal public meaning also leads to original methods because an informed 
and reasonable speaker of the language would have understood the Constitution to be 
subject to the interpretive rules applicable to such a document” (p. 121). 
 18. See generally SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM & 
THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828 (1999); JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996). 
 19. For a fine recent discussion of the ratification debates, see PAULINE MAIER, 
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788 (2010).  
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controversies . . . between a State and citizens of another State.”20 
Depending on one’s interpretive method, this text may, or may 
not, authorize suits for money damages brought by individual 
citizens against a non-consenting state. Read “liberally,”21 the text 
would include all controversies between a state and a citizen of 
another state, including suits for money damages.22 If, however, 
one were to apply the interpretive method of “strict 
construction,”23 then Article III would authorize only those suits 
in which the state was the plaintiff or had otherwise consented to 
being sued. Both “liberal” and “strict” methods of interpretation 
had their advocates at the time of the Founding, and it is not at all 
clear that a supermajority expressly embraced one or the other 
when they adopted Article III (along with the rest of the 
Constitution). 
When the subject came up during the ratification debates, 
Federalists promised the state ratifying conventions that the text 
of Article III would not be construed to allow individual suits for 
money damages against the states. Alexander Hamilton, James 
Madison, James Iredell, Rufus King, John Marshall, and others 
assured the conventions that delegated power would be strictly 
construed to avoid just such a result.24 Despite these assurances, 
in Chisholm v. Georgia the Supreme Court ruled 4-1 in favor of 
state suability.25 The state legislatures responded to the majority 
opinion in Chisholm by quickly adopting the Eleventh 
Amendment, an amendment St. George Tucker described as 
correcting an erroneous interpretation of the Constitution.26 John 
Marshall disagreed with Tucker on that point,27 but the 
disagreement just illustrates the problem: perceiving the Eleventh 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2. 
 21. See Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of 
an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 
105 (Harold C. Syrett, et al., eds., 1961–87). 
 22. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
 23. See id. at 429 (opinion of Iredell, J.). See also ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 1 
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION 
AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed., The Lawbook Exchange 2006) 
(1803). 
 24. For a detailed discussion of Federalist assurances about strict construction of 
Article III, see Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and 
the Background Principle of Strict Construction, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1577, 1599 
(2009). 
 25. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
 26. See Lash, supra note 24, at 1683–85, 1685 n.569. 
 27. See id. at 1678; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 406 (1821).  
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Amendment as restoring or amending the original meaning of 
Article III depended on one’s method of interpretation. 
If we had clear evidence that a supermajority of the framers 
or ratifiers embraced one method over the other, then this would 
justify judicial application of that method. Unfortunately, we have 
nothing near this level of evidence from the extant historical 
materials. At most, we have broad agreement that states would 
retain their sovereign status following the adoption of the 
Constitution, and this might imply something like a “strict 
construction” approach to texts like Article III.28 But even this 
point remained under significant dispute for decades—indeed, to 
this very day. 
McGinnis and Rappaport are correct that the original 
framers and ratifiers likely assumed that judges would apply some 
method of interpretation in their liquidation of textual meaning.29 
But, again, this merely establishes the rather unhelpful point that 
the Founding generation broadly agreed that judging sometimes, 
in some cases, involved the application of some kind of 
interpretive method. For McGinnis and Rappaport to succeed, 
they must go beyond this general point and show that a 
supermajority of the framers or ratifiers embraced one or more 
particular methods of interpretation for the particular texts of our 
particular Constitution. Absent such evidence, a judge’s choice of 
interpretive method will not be guided by supermajoritarian 
agreement, but by her normative theory of constitutional law. But 
this is precisely the kind of non-originalist normative choice that 
McGinnis and Rappaport reject. 
Perhaps recognizing the impossible task of proving express 
ratifier reliance on specific rules of construction, McGinnis and 
Rappaport suggest that a supermajority of the framers and 
ratifiers can be presumed to have accepted the interpretive rules 
of common law explicated in treatises such as Blackstone’s 
Commentaries (p. 135). Historical scholars of the period would 
never accept such a presumption. Despite the continued influence 
of the common law in general, and Blackstone’s Commentaries in 
particular, the same generation that adopted the Constitution also 
challenged the uncritical acceptance of English common law. 
American legal theorists at the time of the Founding increasingly 
 28. See Lash, supra note 24, at 1685–91. 
 29. See p. 129 (“[T]here is strong evidence that the constitutional enactors would 
have assumed that the interpretive rules that applied to all legal documents would also 
apply to the Constitution. These rules were applied generally to legal documents, and it is 
hard to believe that they would not have been applied to the Constitution”).  
 
KURT LASH MCGINNIS_DRAFT 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 3:11 PM 
2015] BOOK REVIEWS 157 
believed that many of the legal and interpretive rules of the 
common law were rooted in an ancient system of hereditary 
sovereigns.30 To these reformers, many common law rules either 
had to be abandoned or significantly modified in a legal system 
based on the sovereignty of the people. 
For example, St. George Tucker’s 1803 edition of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries was a hugely successful and 
influential effort to “translate” the rules of English common law 
so that they made better sense for a people whose legal system 
presumed the ultimate sovereignty of the people themselves.31 
The United States was not just a new and independent legal 
entity, the country and its citizens had operationalized a new legal 
theory. The status of the government and the role of its courts 
were different on American soil, rendering problematic any 
wholesale adoption of Blackstonian common law. As historian 
Davison Douglas writes: 
While serving as a law professor at The College of William and 
Mary during the 1790s, Tucker had his students read 
Blackstone, but he supplemented that reading with lectures in 
which he analyzed the ways that law in the United States—and 
specifically Virginia—had departed from English legal 
principles as a result of the American Revolution, the Virginia 
Constitution, and the United States Constitution. These 
lectures were “the first systematic effort by any figure in 
American law to describe the contours of the new system 
created by the amended Constitution.” Drawing extensively on 
his William and Mary lectures, Tucker’s Blackstone included 
eight hundred pages of essays on a variety of legal and political 
topics and more than one thousand footnotes in which Tucker 
examined Blackstone in light of American and Virginian law. 
Tucker worried about the effect Blackstone’s Tory sensibilities 
 30. For a discussion of Founding-era resistance to Blackstone and unreconstructed 
principles of common law, see Aaron T. Knapp, Law’s Revolutionary: James Wilson and 
the Birth of American Jurisprudence, 29 J. L. & POLITICS 189, 297–99 nn.565–66 (2013). 
 31. According to Tucker,”[T]he American revolution has formed a new epoch in the 
history of civil institutions, by reducing to practice, what, before, had been supposed to 
exist only in the visionary speculations of theoretical writers. . . . The world, for the first 
time since the annals of its inhabitants began, saw an original written compact formed by 
the free and deliberate voices of individuals disposed to unite in the same social bonds . ... 
This memorable precedent . . . led the way to that instrument, by which the union of the 
confederated states has since been completed, and in which, as we shall hereafter endeavor 
to sh[o]w, the sovereignty of the people, and the responsibility of their servants are 
principles fundamentally, and unequivocally, established; in which the powers of the 
several branches of government are defined, and the excess of them, as well in the 
legislature, as in the other branches, finds limits, which cannot be transgressed without 
offending against that greater power from whom all authority, among us, is derived; to wit, 
the PEOPLE.” TUCKER, supra note 23, Appendix A.  
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might have on his students. He thus emphasized to his students 
that the American Revolution and its aftermath had produced 
a revolution “not only in the principles of our government,” but 
in a variety of legal principles, such as the law of inheritance, 
that reflected the new nation’s republican values and that 
rendered Blackstone an unreliable guide to certain aspects of 
American law.32 
St. George Tucker’s “translation” of Blackstone found an 
eager audience. Again, according to Douglas, 
Tucker’s Blackstone, the first major legal treatise on American 
law, was one of the most influential legal works of the early 
nineteenth century and the most comprehensive treatise on 
American constitutional law until around 1820. Not 
surprisingly, it was also one of the legal texts most frequently 
cited by the United States Supreme Court and relied upon by 
lawyers appearing before the Court during the first few 
decades of the nineteenth century.33  
The point here is not that the country had completely 
abandoned Blackstone and the methods of the common law—the 
very success of Tucker’s “translation” shows they had not. But 
that same success indicates that one cannot rely on long-standing 
usage at common law as a proxy for supermajoritarian-level 
acceptance at the time of the Founding. Although McGinnis and 
Rapport cite examples of historical figures who followed some 
common law rules (p. 136), they do not undertake a fine-grained, 
time-specific analysis of the common law in the United States in 
1787. Had they done so, they likely would have noticed the rules 
were undergoing both challenge and change, to a degree fatal to 
any claim that the rules were so widely known and accepted that 
we can presume they were baked into the constitutional text. 
The problem of evolving legal principles at the time of the 
Founding is especially salient in determining the appropriate 
methods for interpreting the text of the federal Constitution. At 
one point, McGinnis and Rappaport insist that the “the reader of 
the US Constitution would recognize that its meaning depends on 
interpretive rules that were generally deemed applicable to 
written constitutions of this type” (p. 124). Contra McGinnis and 
Rappaport, however, there were no other written constitutions of 
“this type.” The very idea of a written, judicially enforceable 
 32. Davison Douglas, Forward: The Legacy of St. George Tucker, 47 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1111, 1113–14 (2006) (citations omitted). 
 33. Id. at 1114.  
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constitution was something new under the sun in post-
Revolutionary America. As the theory of popular sovereignty 
established itself in post-Revolutionary America, the legitimacy 
of state constitutions adopted by anyone other than “the people 
themselves” came under fire, with Massachusetts being among 
the first to submit the document for popular ratification.34 Even if 
the theory of written and enforceable state constitutions had 
remained static in the thirteen years between the Revolution and 
the Founding (which it did not), it is hard to imagine how 
“methods of interpretation” in such a short time could have 
evolved and established themselves across every state to such a 
degree as becoming part of the meaning of the federal 
Constitution. 
The authors also maintain that the same supermajority that 
adopted the Constitution would have also presumed that the same 
methods of interpretation currently applied to state constitutions 
also would apply to the federal Constitution. As they put it: 
A strong case can also be made that the enactors would have 
assumed that many of the interpretive rules applied to state 
constitutions would be applied to the federal Constitution. As 
the use of the term constitution suggests, the enactors modeled 
the federal constitution on the preexisting state constitutions. 
While the federal Constitution differed in some respects from 
the state constitutions, these differences are more political than 
legal (p. 129). 
This assertion is even more problematic than the assumed 
reliance on Blackstonian common law. If we know anything about 
the rules of interpretation in play at the time of the Founding, we 
know that the proponents of the Constitution rejected this very 
argument. As Federalists repeatedly pointed out, the structure 
and theory of the federal Constitution fundamentally differed 
from that informing the constitutions of the several states.35 The 
 34. See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 
339–41 (1969). 
 35. The distinction between proper interpretation of state constitutions and the 
federal constitution was key to justifying the omission of a Bill of Rights from the original 
proposed Constitution. Where the interpretation of state constitutions presumed 
unenumerated police powers (thus the need for express restrictions in the form of a Bill of 
Rights), the federal Constitution operated under an assumed reservation of non-delegated 
powers (thus no need to protect subjects not expressly placed in the hands of the national 
government). As James Wilson explained in his famous Statehouse Speech, “It will be 
proper . . . to mark the leading discrimination between the state constitutions and the 
Constitution of the United States. When the people established the powers of legislation 
under their separate governments, they invested their representatives with every right and 
authority which they did not in explicit terms reserve; and therefore upon every question,  
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provisions of state constitutions presumed a government of 
general (unenumerated) power. Limiting the powers of such 
governments required particular restrictions such as those found 
in a written Declaration of Rights. Absent such restrictions, state 
governments were presumed to have power to enact any 
legislation that furthered the health, welfare, or morals of the 
community. 
The federal Constitution, on the other hand, reflected a very 
different theory of constitutional power. When anti-federalists 
objected to the omission of a Declaration (or Bill) of Rights, the 
Federalists denied that any such Bill was necessary: the federal 
Constitution was not the same kind of legal document as state 
constitutions and it required different rules of constitutional 
interpretation. Powers were presumed retained unless expressly 
delegated. As no power over speech or fundamental rights had 
been delegated, there was no need to expressly deny such powers 
through the addition of an enumerated list of retained rights. 
Indeed, adding a Bill of Rights created the danger that the federal 
Constitution would be interpreted the same way as state 
constitutions, allowing federal authority to fill in any area not 
placed expressly off-limits by a Bill of Rights.36 Although 
respecting the jurisdiction of the house of assembly, if the frame of government is silent, 
the jurisdiction is efficient and complete. But in delegating federal powers, another 
criterion was necessarily introduced, and the congressional power is to be collected, not 
from tacit implication, but from the positive grant expressed in the instrument of the union. 
Hence, it is evident, that in the former case everything which is not reserved is given, but 
in the latter the reverse of the proposition prevails, and everything which is not given, is 
reserved. . . . In truth then, the proposed system possesses no influence whatever upon the 
press, and it would have been merely nugatory to have introduced a formal declaration 
upon the subject -- nay, that very declaration might have been construed to imply that 
some degree of power was given, since we undertook to define its extent.” James Wilson, 
Speech in the State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167–68 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
Wilson’s Statehouse Speech and his explanation regarding the omission of the Bill of 
Rights were extremely influential during the ratification debates. See MAIER, 
RATIFICATION, supra note 19, at 77–82. 
 36. Wilson’s distinction between interpretation of state and federal constitutions was 
repeated by other federalists throughout the ratification debates. See 4 JONATHAN 
ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 140–41 (1827) (reporting the remarks of Archibald 
Maclaine before the North Carolina convention on July 28, 1788) (“[T]he powers of 
Congress are expressly defined; and the very definition of them is as valid and efficacious 
a check as a bill of rights could be, without the dangerous implication of a bill of rights. 
The powers of Congress are limited and enumerated. . . . It is as plain a thing as possibly 
can be, that Congress can have no power but what we expressly give them.”); id. at 142 
(reporting the statement of Samuel Johnston before the North Carolina convention on 
July 22, 1788) (“A bill of rights may be necessary in a monarchical government, whose 
powers are undefined. . . .The Congress cannot assume any other powers than those 
expressly given them.”). As James Iredell explained in the North Carolina Ratifying  
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McGinnis and Rappaport point to the dispute over the Bill of 
Rights as evidence that there were agreed upon methods of 
interpretation (p. 127), that particular debate illustrates why we 
cannot assume that a supermajority of the Founders believed that 
the interpretative methods applicable to the state constitutions 
also applied to the federal Constitution. 
Even more problematically, the debate over the Bill of 
Rights brings into sharp relief the fact that there were no pre-
existing methods of interpretation applicable to a “federal” 
Constitution—no such constitution had ever existed. The 
American experiment with constitutionally entrenched 
federalism brought forth something new under the sun, and it 
required the development of new legal principles to deal with the 
inevitable competing claims of state and national governments. 
There simply was nothing in the annals of English common law, 
or even American state constitutional law, that provided 
methodological guidance to courts faced with a politically 
entrenched division of sovereign authority.37 
This lack of historical interpretive models left the Founding 
generation to their own devices in constructing the proper rules 
of constitutional interpretation. Not surprisingly, nationalists such 
as Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall insisted that the 
federal Constitution should be interpreted in a manner that best 
advanced the perceived needs of a single national People. This 
approach encouraged a broad interpretation of national power in 
order to avoid unanticipated “gaps” in regulatory authority—gaps 
that could not be filled by the people themselves (since they 
Convention, “Thus a bill of rights might operate as a snare rather than a protection. If we 
had formed a general legislature, with undefined powers, a bill of rights would not only 
have been proper, but necessary; and it would have then operated as an exception to the 
legislative authority in such particulars. It has this effect in respect to some of the American 
constitutions, where the powers of legislation are general. But where they are powers of a 
particular nature, and expressly defined, as in the case of the Constitution before us, I 
think, for the reasons I have given, a bill of rights is not only unnecessary, but would be 
absurd and dangerous.” Id. at 149. 
 37.  As James Madison explained, “It has been too much the case in expounding the 
Constitution of the U.S. that its meaning has been sought not in its peculiar and 
unprecedented modifications of Power; but by viewing it, some through the medium of a 
simple Govt. others thru' that of a mere League of Govts. It is neither the one nor the 
other; but essentially different from both. It must consequently be its own interpreter. No 
other Government can furnish a key to its true character. Other Government present an 
individual & indivisible sovereignty. The Constitution of the U.S. divides the sovereignty; 
the portion surrendered by the States, composing the federal sovereignty over specified 
subjects; the portions retained forming the sovereignty of each over the residuary subjects 
within its sphere.” James Madison to Nicholas P. Trist (Feb. 15, 1830), reprinted in 1 THE 
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 239 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph P. Lerner eds. 1987).  
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lacked any politically operational existence outside of 
convention) and which might soon make of the Constitution an 
unhelpful if “splendid bauble.” As Hamilton put it in his 1791 
defense of the proposed national bank: 
[T]he powers contained in a constitution of government, 
especially those which concern the general administration of 
the affairs of a country, its finances, trade, defence, etc. ought 
to be construed liberally, in advancement of the public good. 
This rule does not depend on the particular form of a 
government or on the particular demarkation of the 
boundaries of its powers, but on the nature and objects of 
government itself. The means by which national exigencies are 
to be provided for, national inconveniences obviated, national 
prosperity promoted, are of such infinite variety, extent and 
complexity that there must, of necessity be great latitude of 
discretion in the selection and application of those means. 
Hence consequently, the necessity and propriety of exercising 
the authorities intrusted to a government, on principles of 
liberal construction.38 
Notice that Hamilton’s method of “liberal construction” is 
derived from a theory of constitutional government in general, 
not from the U.S. Constitution in particular. According to 
Hamilton, all constitutions should be liberally construed in order 
to cover all possible contingencies and best advance the public 
good. And however broadly state constitutions were construed, 
the federal constitution should receive at least as broad a 
construction (if not more so) because of all “the variety and extent 
of public exigencies, a far greater proportion of which, and far 
more critical kind, are objects of national, than of State 
administration.”39 Here, Hamilton leaves behind his pre-
ratification argument in the Federalist Papers that the theory of 
the federal Constitution required a far more circumscribed 
interpretation of power than that afforded to state constitutions.40  
 38. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion of Alexander Hamilton, on the Constitutionality of 
a National Bank, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE 
UNITED STATES: INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 95, 98–99 (M. 
St. Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall eds., Gales & Seaton 1832). 
 39. Id. at 99. 
 40. Prior to ratification of the Constitution, Hamilton had written: 
But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a 
Constitution like that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate 
the general political interests of the nation, than to a constitution which has the 
regulation of every species of personal and private concerns. If, therefore, the 
loud clamors against the plan of the convention, on this score, are well founded, 
no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for the constitution of this State. But 
the truth is that both of them contain all which, in relation to their objects, is  
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If anything, Hamilton now tilts towards the idea that the 
federal Constitution ought to be construed more broadly than 
state constitutions.  
Washington’s Attorney General Edmund Randolph rejected 
Hamilton’s method of interpretation on the grounds that it failed 
to account for the particular context of the United States 
Constitution. According to Randolph: 
Governments having no written constitution may, perhaps, 
claim a latitude of power not always easy to be determined. 
Those which have written constitutions are circumscribed by a 
just interpretation of the words contained in them. Nay, 
farther; a legislature, instituted even by a written constitution, 
but without a special demarkation of powers, may, perhaps, be 
presumed to be left at large, as to all authority which is 
communicable by the people . . . Essentially otherwise is the 
condition of a legislature whose powers are described. An 
example of the former is in the State Legislatures; of the latter, 
in the Legislature of the Federal Government, the 
characteristic of which has been confessed by Congress, in the 
twelfth amendment, to be, that it claims no powers which are 
not delegated to it. . . . [W]hen we compare the modes of 
construing a State and the Federal constitution, we are 
admonished to be stricter with regard to the latter, because 
there is a greater danger of error in defining partial, than 
general powers.41 
reasonably to be desired. 
 
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which 
they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, 
but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers 
which are not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext 
to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done 
which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty 
of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions 
may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a 
regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, 
a plausible pretense for claiming that power. They might urge with a semblance 
of reason that the Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of 
providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the 
provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication 
that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended to be 
vested in the national government. This may serve as a specimen of the numerous 
handles which would be given to the doctrine of constructive powers, by the 
indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of rights. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 
513–14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,1961). 
 41. Edmund Randolph, Opinion of Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of the 
United States, to President Washington, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES: INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH 
AMERICA, supra note 38, at 86–87.  
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Randolph placed the U. S. Constitution in a particular historical 
context, having been brought into being by pre-existing state 
governments of general police powers and agreed to only because 
the national government would be one of limited particular 
powers. Not all constitutions were alike, and different 
constitutions called for different methods and rules of 
interpretation. Hamilton was simply wrong (or purposefully 
obtuse) to suggest that the methods of interpreting state 
Constitutions also applied to the historically unique federal 
Constitution. Nor was this post-hoc spin: Randolph made the 
same point during the Virginia Ratifying Convention: 
Now is there not a demonstrable difference between the 
principle of the State Government and the General 
Government? There is not a word said in the state government 
of the powers given to it, because they are general. But in the 
general Constitution, its powers are enumerated. Is it not then 
fairly deducible, that it has no power but what is expressly given 
it? For if its powers were to be general, an enumeration would 
be needless.42 
James Madison agreed with Randolph that the peculiar 
circumstances giving rise to the federal Constitution called for 
different interpretations of federal and state constitutional 
powers. According to Madison, “[t]he powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and 
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are 
numerous and indefinite.”43 Similarly, in a speech delivered prior 
to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Madison reminded the 
House of Representatives that the ratifiers were promised a 
narrow construction of federal constitutional power—a “rule of 
construction” arising out of the nature of the document itself.44 
The competing interpretive strategies of Founders like 
Hamilton and Madison famously clashed in the debates over the 
Bank of the United States. Faced with disagreeing advisors, 
President Washington chose Hamilton over Madison. The former 
General, of course, shared the nationalist instincts of military 
colleagues like Hamilton and Marshall, and later sided with them 
 42. Edmund Randolph, Edmund Randolph in the Virginia Ratifying Convention 
(June 17, 1788), in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 1348 (John Kaminsk, Gaspare Salidino, et al. eds., 1993). 
 43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 40, at 292. 
 44. JAMES MADISON, Speech Opposing the Bank of the United States (June 8, 1789), 
in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 482, 489 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).  
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in support of federal power to pass the Alien and Sedition Acts.45 
Rejected by an electorate convinced they had overplayed their 
regulatory hand, the Federalists lost control of the political 
branches in the elections of 1800. This left the judiciary the last 
redoubt for Founding-era nationalism and John Marshall made 
the most of it with decisions like McCulloch v. Maryland46 and 
Gibbons v. Ogden.47 What we tend to forget, however, is how 
controversial those decisions were when first handed down. James 
Madison, for example, rejected Marshall’s reasoning in 
McCulloch v. Maryland,48 and the Chief Justice found himself 
having to defend his opinion in a series of anonymous essays.49 
This is not to suggest that one side or the other in the Bank 
debate had the better interpretive theory—at least not here.50 
Instead, this brief sketch of Founding-era interpretive debates is 
meant to illustrate how problematic it is to assert, as do McGinnis 
and Rappapport, that supermajoritarian agreement on “original 
interpretive methods” can fully close the gap between textual 
meaning and judicial construction. 
CONCLUSION 
Originalism and the Good Constitution is an excellent book 
that both defends originalism (properly done) and presents a 
wealth of evidence indicating that sometimes and in some ways 
legal texts originally were read through the lens of interpretive 
methodology. This alone makes for a valuable contribution to 
legal historical literature. What the authors fail to recognize, 
however, is that the proper methods of constitutional 
interpretation were not only under-resolved at the time of the 
Founding, they were the subject of heated and on-going debate. 
McGinnis and Rappaport have given us good reason to strive for 
supermajoritarian agreement whenever possible, and good reason 
to preserve that agreement until it is superseded by another 
 45. For a discussion of George Washington’s role in disseminating defenses of the 
Alien and Sedition Acts, see Kurt Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall 
and the Defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (2007). 
 46. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). 
 47. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). 
 48. JAMES MADISON, Detached Memoranda, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS, supra 
note 44, at 745, 754–56. 
 49. See JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (Gerald 
Gunther ed., 1969). 
 50. But see KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (2009) 
(presenting historical evidence strongly suggesting that Madison had the more accurate 
understanding of the original meaning of federal power).  
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“speaking of the people.” Methodism cannot, however, give us 
agreement where none existed. Different founders proposed 
different methods of constitutional construction, each reflecting a 
different normative theory of the new federal Constitution.51 This 
dispute cannot be resolved by fiat application of interpretive 
methodology or recourse to an anachronistic reliance on the 
common law; it requires the application of normative theory. This 
is not the result of a temporary gap in our historical knowledge. It 
is history itself that tells us that originalism cannot go all the way 
down. 
 
 51.  No doubt, some theories were more in step with the ratifiers’ understanding than 
others. In fact, I believe it may be possible to establish something like original 
supermajoritarian acceptance of normative political theories such as popular sovereignty. 
But even so, the implications this would have for proper interpretation of the Constitution 
depends on the application of normative theory (in this case, popular sovereignty), and not 
an application of original textual meaning.  
 
